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INTRODUCTION
The legal frameworks relevant to foreign investment interact in complex ways.
International law, domestic law, and investor-state contracts all create various
obligations and/or responsibilities for governments and investors, which can
amplify, undermine, or otherwise complicate other existing legal obligations.
Understanding these frameworks, and how they interact, is critical for anyone
concerned with how foreign investment can be better harnessed to support,
rather than weaken, sustainable development and human rights.
This primer first provides a brief overview of host government obligations
under international investment law, international human rights law, domestic
law, and relevant investor-state contracts. These legal obligations constrain
how governments can or should act, and may influence a host government’s
actions vis-à-vis investors and those who are affected by investors’ actions,
such as local communities and rights-holders. This primer then highlights
some of the ways in which those legal obligations may affect or conflict with
each other.1
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INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW
International investment law is a powerful force. Of the
more than 3,000 existing international investment
treaties, most provide foreign investors with a direct
private right of action to sue their “host” governments in
international arbitration. Investor-state arbitration
provides a relatively easy path to bring a legal challenge,
with investors generally not required to exhaust domestic
remedies (i.e., first seek remedies under national law in a
domestic court or proceeding). If the government is found
to have violated an investment treaty, the investment
arbitration panel established to hear the dispute (typically
three arbitrators) usually awards monetary damages,
which may cover both past losses and lost future profits.
Some awards have been for staggering sums—in 2014, for
example, the Russian government was ordered to pay
over US$50 billion in compensation. Even if a government
ultimately prevails in an arbitration, it may be forced to
expend significant time and resources in defending the
claim.3 Consequently, a government that is wary of
arbitration claims may decline to address its citizens’
concerns in a way that interferes with a (potential)
investment, even in circumstances in which the public
interest would justify or even require such interference.
When it comes to foreign investments, two bodies of
international law are especially important for host
governments. International investment law, established
primarily through bilateral investment treaties and other
trade and investment treaties, regulates a host
government’s treatment of foreign investors. Human
rights law, codified in international instruments at the
international or regional level, provides for a set of rights
that governments must seek to protect, respect, and
fulfill. Traditionally, both investment law and human
rights law create binding legal obligations for
governments, but not for investors. In addition to
international law, domestic law also creates legal
obligations, generally both for governments and for
investors. When used, investor-state contracts are an
additional source of legal obligations.
SECTION
1. LEGAL FRAMEWORKS & OBLIGATIONS
Governments are bound by an intricate web of legal obligations. These include obligations that arise from international
investment law, international human rights law, and other sources of international law, as well as from domestic law and, when
applicable, investor-state contracts. These obligations are enforceable through different mechanisms and to varying degrees.2
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International investment treaties may be relevant even
when not anticipated by a host government, as
corporations can sometimes maneuver to gain protection
of an investment treaty that would otherwise not apply.4
Some investment arbitration tribunals have even
permitted nationals of the host state to obtain treaty
protection by “roundtripping”—i.e., establishing a
corporate entity in a foreign country and routing
investments from the host state through the foreign entity
back to the host state.5 Complicating matters further, some
tribunals have determined that even indirect and minority
non-controlling shareholders can initiate arbitrations,
potentially exposing the government to multiple suits
arising out of the same underlying issue.6 Moreover, even
if a company’s management or majority shareholders
settle or decide to not bring a claim, other arbitrations may
still be brought by minority shareholders in the company. 
International investment treaties commonly contain a
core set of obligations regulating governments’ conduct.
Each of these obligations, which are described briefly in
Box 1, has ramifications for the governance of investments,
as noted below. Despite these implications, however, it is
difficult—and arguably inappropriate—for host states to
shape their conduct in a way that fully avoids all potential
risks. Investment arbitration tribunals are not bound to
follow the decisions of previous cases, which means that
tribunals in pending and future cases have broad latitude
to adopt different interpretations. This lack of precedent,
coupled with vague treaty language and differing
interpretations by arbitration tribunals, renders it difficult
to declare definitively what any one obligation requires.
Thus, assessing in advance what types of conduct will and
will not give rise to claims of breach is a nearly impossible
task, and predicting whether those claims will be
successful can be equally challenging. 
BOX 1: OBLIGATIONS FLOWING FROM INVESTMENT TREATIES
•   Two non-discrimination provisions, the national treatment obligation and the most-favored nation
obligation, prohibit intentional discrimination against foreign investors on account of an investor’s
nationality. According to some tribunals, these obligations also prevent unintentional discrimination.
Some treaties apply these obligations on a pre-establishment basis, meaning that governments commit
to granting protected investors rights to establish investments on the same terms as domestic individuals
and entities (or any other foreign individual or entity).
Government measures that could trigger investment arbitration claims under the non-discrimination
obligations include: 
•  The provision of subsidies to domestic but not foreign-owned firms (intentional discrimination)
•  A regulation preventing or restricting foreigners from investing in a specific industry 
(intentional discrimination)
•  The provision of subsidies to companies under a certain size (resulting in unintentional discrimination)
In addition, using the most-favored nation obligation, tribunals have allowed investors covered by a
treaty between the investor’s home state and the host state to “import” favorable protections and dispute
settlement provisions from other treaties concluded by the host state. This allows the investor to select
the most investor-friendly aspects of different treaties, and bring those different aspects together to create
a new “super-treaty” to protect the investor’s interests.
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BOX 1: OBLIGATIONS FLOWING FROM INVESTMENT TREATIES – CONTINUED
Some international investment treaties include exceptions to these non-discrimination obligations, which
can be used for diverse policy aims. Such objectives might include preventing foreign ownership of certain
investments and assets, or ensuring that governments can comply with other legal obligations (for
example, permitting governments to accord special legal rights to Indigenous peoples within their
territories). Some governments have also included language in their international investment treaties
clarifying that investors cannot use the most-favored nation obligation to “import” substantive standards
from other investment treaties. 
•   Most investment treaties include an obligation to provide compensation for expropriations of an
investor’s property.7 This has been interpreted to require governments to compensate both for direct
expropriations, like outright seizure of property, and for indirect expropriations, such as policy measures
that destroy the economic value of an investment. While direct expropriations are relatively easy to
identify, disputes often arise regarding whether a government regulation or other measure constitutes
an “indirect” expropriation. Because it is difficult to distinguish between indirect expropriations and
legitimate regulatory measures that negatively affect property rights, some more recent agreements have
included additional text to guide tribunals on this point. 
Government measures that could trigger claims under the expropriation provision include: 
•  A regulation requiring that local communities be granted rights of transit across investors’ land
•  Measures restricting extraction of natural resources 
•  Nationalization of public utilities
•  A court order invalidating an investor-state concession contract
•   The fair and equitable treatment (FET) obligation is the standard upon which investors have most
frequently prevailed in publicly-known claims to date. Government conduct that lacks the severity
necessary to amount to an expropriation may still be deemed a violation of the FET obligation. Infamously
vague, the FET obligation has been subject to a wide range of interpretations that can be broken into
two general groups. Under one, FET is a minimum standard of treatment that governments must provide
to foreign investors; under the other, FET imposes more extensive procedural and substantive obligations,
including to not frustrate or interfere with investors’ “legitimate expectations.” 
Although this appears innocuous, the ways in which the FET obligation has been applied raise significant
concerns for governments, and can affect the nature and scope of investor rights. For instance, some
tribunals have interpreted the FET obligation to allow investors to rely on and enforce otherwise non-
binding statements by government officials.8 Government conduct that interferes with an investor’s
expectations generated by those non-binding statements can then result in liability. (Box 2 provides one
example of how an investment arbitration tribunal found that the government violated the investors’
“legitimate expectations” relating to their asserted property rights.) 
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BOX 1: OBLIGATIONS FLOWING FROM INVESTMENT TREATIES – CONTINUED
Government measures that could trigger claims under the FET obligation include:
•  Most actions that would also give rise to claims of expropriation or violations of non-discrimination
obligations
•  A federal government representation that an investment would be allowed, which later turned out to
be untrue in light of local community opposition
•   The full protection and security (FPS) obligation provides foreign investors and investments a measure
of protection against harms caused by non-governmental actors (and, according to some investment
arbitration tribunals, by government actors as well). Some tribunals have interpreted the FPS standard
to protect against any harm, including harm caused by changes in the host government’s legal framework.
Other tribunals have interpreted the obligation more narrowly to protect only against physical harm.
According to this narrower interpretation, governments are only required to exercise due diligence in
providing foreign investors and their investments a normal, non-discriminatory level of police protection.
Some more modern model agreements and treaties have specified that FPS only refers to protection
against physical harm.9
Government measures that could trigger claims under the FPS standard include: 
•  A failure to evict alleged trespassers or squatters from the investor’s property
•  A failure to stop protests interfering with the investor’s operations
•  A failure to prevent or redress the forcible seizure of a foreign investment
•   The “umbrella clause,” which is more common in older investment treaties,10 varies in both its wording
and interpretation. In some cases, and depending on the text and tribunal, umbrella clauses have been
interpreted relatively narrowly, requiring a government to comply with written contractual obligations
entered into with the foreign investor. In other cases, umbrella clauses have been interpreted more
broadly, requiring a government to comply with any obligation it has assumed under domestic or
international law that benefits the investor. According to some tribunals, an umbrella clause will only be
breached if the government was acting in its “sovereign” capacity when it violated its obligation to the
investor (for example, passing a law invalidating an underlying contract). The majority of tribunals,
however, have found that a government can also breach the umbrella clause if it was acting as a normal
contracting party (for example, failing to comply with its duty to make payments under the contract). 
Government measures that could trigger claims under the umbrella clause include: 
•   Efforts to seek renegotiation of an investor-state contract
•   A court decision that a stabilization clause in an investor-state contract is invalid 
•   A government entity’s breach of its contractual obligations to the investor
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BOX 2: TURNING EXPECTATIONS INTO PROPERTY RIGHTS: THE AWDI V. ROMANIA CASE
Under the FET obligation, some investor-state arbitration tribunals have effectively allowed investors to
transform their “legitimate expectations” into enforceable property rights, even if such rights do not exist
under domestic law. The Awdi v. Romania case,11 for example, centered on two decisions by the
Constitutional Court of Romania, which had determined that property rights claimed by the investors
regarding two discrete investments were invalid. The Court’s first decision had invalidated title to a piece of
contested land; the second had found unconstitutional a national law granting the investors a 49-year
concession for lands rented from various local governments. In a subsequent action brought by the investors
against Romania under an investment treaty, the arbitration tribunal did not find fault with the
Constitutional Court’s process or decisions. Nevertheless, the tribunal determined that the investors’
legitimate expectations had been breached and must be compensated. In this way, the Constitutional
Court’s authoritative determination over the validity of the property rights under domestic law resulted in
a breach of the government’s FET obligation. Romania was thus ordered to compensate the investors €7.7
million for damages, with additional payments to cover the investors’ legal fees and related expenses.
BOX 3: FINDING INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION OF AN INVESTMENT THAT WAS UNLIKELY
TO PROCEED: THE BEAR CREEK MINING V. PERU CASE
The Bear Creek Mining v. Peru case concerned a Canadian mining company’s purported investment in Peru for the
development of the Santa Ana mining project close to the border with Bolivia. Development of the mine was
strongly opposed by local communities. In an attempt to deal with the unrest, the government adopted measures
to prohibit mining in the area generally and to address opposition to the Santa Ana mining project specifically;
one such measure revoked a Public Necessity Decree that had authorized the Bear Creek company to own the
Santa Ana concessions. At the time the decree was adopted, the investor had no right to undertake exploitation of
mining resources, as it still had not obtained all necessary authorizations (including an approved EIA as well as at
least 40 other permits required to construct and operate a mine). Nevertheless, the investor brought a claim for
more than US$500 million, claiming, amongst other things, that Peru had unlawfully expropriated its investment. 
The Peru-Canada free trade agreement explicitly addresses “indirect expropriation,” by prohibiting the
government from taking measures that would effectively expropriate an investment, “except for a public purpose,
in accordance with due process of law, in a non discriminatory manner and on prompt, adequate and effective
compensation.”12 The treaty includes an annex intended to guide interpretation and application of this provision,
which states that the determination of whether a measure or series of measures constitutes indirect expropriation
requires consideration of, among other factors: (i) “the economic impact of the measure or series of measures;”
(ii) “the extent to which the measure or series of measures interferes with distinct, reasonable investment-backed
expectations;” and (iii) “the character of the measure or series of measures.”13 Following limited engagement
with the three-prong test laid out in the treaty’s annex, the tribunal concluded that Bear Creek’s investment had
been unlawfully expropriated and ordered Peru to pay approximately US$18 million in damages, estimated to
account for Bear Creek’s “sunk costs.”14 The tribunal reached this conclusion despite its acknowledgment that,
even without Peru’s revocation of its initial authorizations, the mining project was unlikely to proceed.15




In the context of investments, international human rights
law will often create countervailing pressures for
governments. Whereas international investment law
obliges governments to provide certain protections to
investors, international human rights law sets out
protections for individuals and peoples—including those
who risk being negatively affected by investments—and
creates corresponding duties for governments.16
Compared to international investment law, human rights
law is far less fragmented: rather than the thousands of
investment treaties, there are fewer than a dozen core
human rights treaties at the international level,17
supplemented by other relevant multilateral treaties
(such as International Labour Organization Conventions)
and regional human rights treaties in Africa, the
Americas, and Europe. Instead of the dispute-specific
tribunals created under investment treaties, human
rights redress mechanisms are provided through more
established forums. These include regional human rights
courts, regional human rights commissions, and
complaints mechanisms tied to specific treaties.
These human rights fora differ from investment
arbitration processes in two important ways. First, they
generally are only accessible once claimants have
exhausted available domestic remedies. Second, the
remedies awarded by human rights tribunals are not
usually in the form of monetary damages. Even when
monetary awards are provided, the high sums seen in
investment law disputes are not common in human
rights judgments.18
BOX 4: RIGHTS VIOLATIONS TIED TO EVICTIONS: THE ENDOROIS CASE 
The decision of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in the Endorois case concerned the
Kenyan government’s eviction of hundreds of families belonging to the Indigenous Endorois people from
their ancestral lands to create game reserves for tourism, and to grant concessions for forestry and mining.19
The Endorois were not properly consulted or compensated, and were prevented from accessing the land
and resources needed for traditional medicines. 
The Commission found that the government had violated the community’s rights to religion and culture by
restricting access to the land and impeding the Endorois’ traditional pastoralist way of life. The community’s
right to property, and its right to freely dispose of its wealth and natural resources, were also found to have
been violated by restricting the Endorois’ access to the land and resources. Finally, the Commission found
that the government violated the community’s right to development, given the community’s lack of
involvement in the process of developing the region for tourism.  The Commission recommended that the
government recognize the Endorois’ ownership of the land, and return the land to them. It also
recommended that the government pay compensation for additional losses, and ensure that the
community benefit from any royalties and employment opportunities generated from existing economic
activities on the land. 
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States that have ratified human rights treaties have
corresponding obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill
the human rights codified therein.23 Specifically, this
means that they must refrain from violating those rights,
must prevent third parties from violating those rights,
and must take steps to progressively realize those rights
(this latter point is often more applicable to economic,
social, and cultural rights). In addition to binding treaties,
soft law instruments, such as U.N. declarations, general
comments by treaty bodies, and widely endorsed
guidelines negotiated by governments, help in
interpreting human rights law. Box 6 describes some of
the human rights that are most frequently affected by
foreign investments, particularly investments in natural
resource projects. 
BOX 5: BRUTAL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AIDED BY THE INVESTOR: THE KILWA CASE 
This decision by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights concerned the 2004 massacre of
more than 70 people by the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo, which was aided and abetted
by Anvil Mining, an Australian-Canadian mining company that operated a copper and silver mine 50
kilometers from Kilwa, where the massacre took place. Following a low-level rebellion, Anvil Mining, seeking
to protect its investment, provided instrumental logistical support to the Congolese military. In a brutal and
heavy-handed response, the soldiers proceeded to indiscriminately shell civilians, summarily execute at
least 28 people, and disappear many others.20
The Commission found that the government violated articles 1, 4, 5, 6, 7(1)(a),7(1)(c), 14, 22, and 26 of the
African Charter, including through extrajudicial executions, torture, arbitrary arrests, disappearances, forced
displacement, and violations of the right to housing, and awarded the eight victims named in the complaint
US $2.5 million, the highest ever award by the African Commission.21 It urged the Congolese government to
identify and compensate other victims and their families not party to the complaint who were also directly
affected by the attack. The Commission further recommended that the government formally apologize to
the people of Kilwa, exhume and re-bury with dignity the bodies dumped in a mass grave, construct a
memorial, provide trauma counseling for those affected, and rebuild the schools, hospitals, and other
structures destroyed during the attack.22 Finally, the Commission urged the Congolese government to launch
a new criminal investigation and to take all due measures to prosecute and punish agents of both the state
and Anvil Mining Company.
Creating a water well in Gayo
village, Ethiopia.
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BOX 6: HUMAN RIGHTS THAT CAN BE AFFECTED BY FOREIGN INVESTMENTS
Several human rights instruments protect the right to property, which includes the right  to not be arbitrarily
deprived of property. This right can generally be limited for actions that are “in the public interest.” 
The prohibition of forced eviction forbids the coerced or involuntary displacement of individuals or
communities from their home or lands without appropriate protection. A government that undertakes or
fails to prevent forced evictions related to an investment may violate a range of legally protected human
rights, including the right to adequate housing.24
The right to free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) requires governments to consult and cooperate in
good faith with Indigenous and tribal peoples to obtain their FPIC before: relocating them; approving any
project affecting their lands, territories, or resources; or adopting and implementing legislative or
administrative measures that may affect them. Regional human rights bodies have clarified that Indigenous
rights can apply to peoples that identify as Indigenous but are not recognized as such by the government,25
and that Indigenous rights can also extend to groups that are not Indigenous but that nevertheless share
similar connections to and dependencies on land and natural resources.26 Government measures that
violate the right to FPIC include allowing an investment to displace Indigenous peoples without their
consent, regardless of whether such peoples hold formal title to the land. Such an action might also violate
the right of minorities to enjoy their own culture, which includes protections of land use or ownership
where the culture is closely tied to the land.
The right to water protects individuals’ access to existing water supplies, and includes the right to be free
from interference, such as from arbitrary disconnections or contamination of water supplies. An investment
that diverts or pollutes water relied on by local individuals or communities thus might give rise to a violation
of their right to water.
The right to food is realized when an individual has uninterrupted physical and economic access to
adequate food, or to the means for procuring adequate food, such as access to land and other productive
resources. When a government allows an investor to displace people from land on which they had relied
for access to food, it is failing to protect the right to food.
The right to health contains both entitlements and freedoms, such as the right to control one’s health and
body, and the right to be free from interference. An investment that directly or indirectly contributes to poor
health can affect this right for workers or local communities. Such practices might also affect their right to a
healthy environment, which includes the right to live in an environment adequate for health and wellbeing. 
The right to self-determination includes the right of peoples to freely dispose of their natural wealth and
resources. Investments that deprive peoples of their access to productive resources might infringe on this right.
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BOX 6: HUMAN RIGHTS THAT CAN BE AFFECTED BY FOREIGN INVESTMENTS – CONTINUED
The right to life must be protected by law, and the right to liberty and security of person prohibits arbitrary
arrest or detention. In addition, there is a right to peaceful assembly, which includes the right to participate
in peaceful meetings or protests, as well as the right to freedom of expression, which covers the freedom
to seek, receive, and impart information (including a right of access to information held by public bodies).
These rights are sometimes at risk when the government or private security forces respond to efforts by
community members or human rights defenders to draw attention to the negative impacts of an investment. 
The right to just and favorable conditions of work includes requirements for fair wages and safe and
healthy working conditions. The right to form and join trade unions and the right to freedom of association
cover workers’ rights to form and join unions to protect their interests. Government sometimes fail to ensure
that these rights are respected in the operation of foreign investments. 
BOX 7: OTHER INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS
In addition to obligations under investment law and human rights law, governments have obligations under
other types of international law, such as international environmental law and international humanitarian
law. For example:
•   States party to the Convention on Biological Diversity are bound to respect and maintain
environmentally beneficial knowledge, innovations, and practices of Indigenous and other local
communities practicing traditional lifestyles, and to do so with their approval and involvement.
•   Individuals displaced during armed conflict have a right to voluntary return in safety, with the
government’s assistance, to their homes or places of habitual residence as soon as the reasons for their
displacement cease to exist. The property of displaced individuals, and of civilians more generally, must
not be destroyed or appropriated as part of a reprisal or collective punishment.27
•   During armed conflict, governments must protect cultural property (defined as “movable or immovable
property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people”), which can include archaeological
sites, such as Indigenous burial sites and places of worship.28
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DOMESTIC LAW
Within specific jurisdictions, domestic laws and
regulations shape how investments are undertaken and
regulated, providing processes and rules to be followed.29
For instance, a law might describe the incentives to be
offered to investors, prevent foreigners from purchasing
certain types of land or property, or set out the
authorizations required to receive a permit. Individuals
claiming breach of a domestic law generally seek redress
through domestic courts. A court might, for example,
assess the legality of a concession under domestic law. 
Depending on the jurisdiction, there may be specific laws
regulating investments or protecting human rights. Some
of these laws provide greater protection—of investments,
or of human rights—than at the international level. For
example, a domestic investment law might expand the
opportunities for investment dispute procedures beyond
what an investor would receive under an applicable
investment treaty. In turn, a domestic human rights law
might set forth more specific obligations that a government
must follow. One distinction from international law is that
domestic law frequently also creates obligations for
investors, rather than just for governments.
BOX 8: ROLE OF THE DOMESTIC COURT: EXAMPLE FROM PAPUA NEW GUINEA  
In 2012, a Malaysian investor acquired, through acquisitions of another company, two Special Agriculture
& Business Leases (SABLs) in Papua New Guinea for over 38,000 hectares of land, which it planned to use
for oil palm plantations.30 Communities protested these plans, claiming that they were customary owners
of the land in question. Plaintiffs representing the affected communities sought judicial review of the leases,
arguing that the procedures established by law to obtain SABLs were not followed.31 The National Court of
Papua New Guinea issued an interim injunction restraining activities on the land, and the leases were
subsequently quashed. The investor stated in an announcement that it would comply with the related
Order, and also noted that “without the acceptance and co-operation of the customary land owners …,
there will be no end to challenges over [its] right to operate ….”32
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INVESTOR-STATE CONTRACTS
In some countries, large-scale investments may be
governed by contractual agreements between foreign
investors and host governments. Investments in natural
resources or in industries that have traditionally been
considered “public services,” for example, may be
governed by such agreements. These contracts allocate
risk between contracting parties and delineate a range
of rights and obligations. Investor-state contracts differ
in their complexity, as well as in their purported
comprehensiveness. 
Investor-state contracts sometimes include a
stabilization clause addressing how changes in the law
of the host state will affect the contract. Stabilization
clauses can be framed broadly, as applying to all
domestic laws, or narrowly, applying only to certain
topics (for example, tax laws). There are three general
categories of stabilization clauses:
•    Freezing clauses specify that the law in effect on the
day that a contract is signed will apply to the
investment for the life of the project regardless of any
subsequent changes in law.
•    Economic equilibrium clauses require an investor 
to comply with new laws, but oblige the host state 
to compensate the investor for any loss incurred in
doing so. 
•    Hybrid clauses are a combination of freezing clauses
and economic equilibrium clauses.33
Although stabilization clauses are discouraged by the
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises34 and by
UN human rights guidance,35 some investors continue to
seek them in the hopes of insulating the investment from
unpredictable and costly changes in domestic laws. As
explained below, such clauses interact with international
investment law and international human rights law in
various ways. 
Investor-state contracts generally define the process to
be used in addressing disputes arising out of or in
connection with the contract. Many provide for
commercial arbitration under the same or similar rules
that govern arbitration arising out of investment treaties;
as with investment arbitration, these commercial
arbitrations often occur outside of the host country.
Thus, while only an investor can bring a claim for breach
of an investment treaty obligation, either the investor or
the government can bring a claim under commercial
arbitration for breach of a contractual obligation. 
Palm Oil Seedings 
on a plantation in
Kalimantan, Indonesia.
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The rise of international investment treaties, however, has
complicated the role of domestic law. One effect of these
treaties is to elevate states’ contractual commitments to
investors to the international law level, placing those
commitments above—rather than subordinate to—
domestic law. Thus, even if a domestic court deems a
stabilization clause or other contractual provision invalid,
an investment arbitration tribunal asked to interpret the
investor-state contract may adopt a different view,
holding the government to those promises and enforcing
them under the umbrella clause and/or fair and equitable
treatment obligation. In this way, the presence of an
international investment treaty can potentially shield a
contractual clause from challenges that, under domestic
law, might have been successful. 
Moreover, international investment treaties have been
interpreted in a way that effectively creates new property
rights that might not exist under domestic law. In
evaluating whether the fair and equitable treatment
standard was breached, some investment arbitration
tribunals have determined that investors’ rights and
mere “legitimate expectations” are protected against
subsequent government interference. Under this
reasoning, even if a tribunal determined that the investor
did not possess a valid property right or authorization
Governments’ obligations under these different legal
frameworks and agreements interact in various and
complex ways. They may, at times, also conflict.
Investor-state contracts, for example, are generally
subordinate to domestic law. However, a stabilization
clause in the contract means that the contracting parties
have sought to circumvent relevant changes in the
domestic law, by excepting the investor from having to
comply with or incur the costs of those changes. This
may be acceptable in some jurisdictions. Yet it may not
be allowed in others, where a court might deem such a
clause to be invalid and unenforceable on grounds that
it violates the constitutional separation of powers or
improperly restricts the government’s power to act in the
public interest. Additionally, investor-state contracts may
seek to create a particular legal regime that differs from
what would originally apply under domestic law. Some
contracts, for example, provide for particular methods of
dispute settlement, and purport to impose specialized
rules on available remedies. As with stabilization
provisions, the enforceability of such provisions
traditionally depends on the domestic law that governs
the contract (which is often, but not necessarily, the law
of the host state).
SECTION
2. INTERACTION BETWEEN LEGAL OBLIGATIONS 
Governments’ legal obligations interact in complex ways, and can even conflict with each other. For example, investor-state
contracts are generally subordinate to domestic law, but can be essentially elevated above domestic law by an international
investment treaty. Investment treaties have also been interpreted in a way that effectively creates new property rights that
might not exist under domestic law. At the same time, an investor-state contract can potentially create obligations that
conflict with a government’s obligations under international human rights law, while a government’s obligations under an
investment treaty and under relevant human rights treaties may also be in tension.
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under domestic law, it could still conclude that the
investor had formed “expectations” that should be
protected. This essentially turns these expectations into
new and enforceable property rights. Such an
interpretation differs from the traditional approach under
international law, which recognizes the power of
domestic systems to define whether and to what extent
a property right exists. 
Astoundingly, an international investment treaty can
potentially protect an entire investor-state contract (or
provisions in that contract) that might otherwise be
deemed illegal or unenforceable under domestic law.
This is less likely when the illegal nature of the contract
is severe: some tribunals, for example, have determined
that they do not have the power to hear claims brought
by investors that have secured their contracts through
corruption or fraud. Yet tribunals have been less likely to
dismiss cases in which contracts are illegal on other
grounds—for example, if the government authority that
signed the contract did not have the authority to do so,
or if the process of entering into the contract did not
comply with necessary requirements established by
domestic law.36
Even in the absence of a stabilization clause in an investor-
state contract, some investment arbitration tribunals have
determined that promises of legal stability can be inferred
from the fact that, when the investor and government
entered into their contract, the deal was governed by a
particular legal framework. Changes to that framework
could then, according to these tribunals, give rise to a
violation of the fair and equitable treatment obligation. In
such a situation, an international investment treaty may
also have the effect of shielding an investor from
complying with, or requiring the government to provide
compensation for the costs of, changes in the legal
framework that negatively affect the investor, even without
the parties having explicitly agreed that the government
would provide the investor such protections.
International investment treaties are typically
asymmetrical (creating protections for investors and
corresponding obligations for governments), and
therefore do not have a similar impact on investors’
contractual commitments to governments. One example
is found in the context of renegotiation of investor-state
contracts. Due to investment arbitration tribunal
decisions interpreting the fair and equitable treatment
obligation as requiring governments to protect investors’
“legitimate expectations,” and the umbrella clause’s
mandate that host states abide by commitments made
to foreign investors, host governments may be
constrained in their ability to seek renegotiation. In
contrast, investors retain more freedom to request
renegotiations—or to resist renegotiation attempts by
states—without incurring liability under international law.
Given that international and regional human rights
treaties are not principally concerned with the protection
of investment, they generally do not affect commitments
in investor-state contracts as investment treaties do.37 Yet
international human rights law and investor-state
contracts can potentially create conflicting obligations
for governments. For example, a contract granting a
concession that results in air pollution violating a
community’s right to a healthy environment, or that
displaces Indigenous peoples without their free, prior
and informed consent, would place the government’s
human rights obligations in conflict with its contractual
obligations. Similarly, a broadly framed stabilization
clause in an investor-state contract may be in tension
with a government’s human rights obligations to the
extent that the clause limits the applicability to the
underlying investment of new laws or policies necessary
to respect, protect, or fulfill human rights.38 When a
government is party to an investment treaty relevant for
the investment, the treaty can create an additional
potential conflict between the government’s obligations
under the investment treaty and under relevant human
rights treaties. 
This web of international, domestic, and contractual
legal obligations can pose difficulties for governments
seeking to assess their full set of obligations, as well as
to take actions to protect rights-holders in the context of
investment. To date, international tribunals have not
provided much assistance in resolving potential conflicts,
tending either to avoid finding that a conflict exists or to
resolve a dispute based only on one set of legal
obligations, as noted in Box 9.
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PROTECTION OBLIGATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS
Few human rights courts, tribunals, or expert bodies have addressed how a conflict between a state’s human
rights obligations and its obligations under an international investment treaty should be determined. One
notable exception, however, is found in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ decision in the case of
Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay (March 2006). That case focused on Paraguay’s failure to
resolve a legal claim by the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community of the Enxet-Lengua people over the
community’s ancestral lands, which had been sold by the government to foreign investors. Paraguay argued
that the land had been bought by a German national, whose interest in the land was protected by a “bilateral
treaty”39 between Paraguay and Germany. While the Court rejected that argument on procedural grounds,
it also offered two alternative justifications for upholding the community’s rights to the land even when a
bilateral investment treaty might be operative. The Court’s first alternative rationale was that the bilateral
investment treaty allowed for expropriation of capital investments where necessary for a public purpose,
and such a purpose could include the restitution of ancestral land to an Indigenous community. Its second
alternative rationale involved holding that the bilateral and reciprocal nature of the investment treaty
rendered it inferior to the American Convention on Human Rights, asserting that the enforcement of
“bilateral commercial treaties … should always be compatible with the American Convention, which is a
multilateral treaty on human rights that stands in a class of its own and that generates rights for individual
human beings and does not depend entirely on reciprocity among States.”40
Investment arbitration tribunals have also generally avoided addressing conflicts between a state’s
obligations under human rights treaties and an investment treaty.41 While host governments or amicus
curiae have made submissions to investment arbitration tribunals asking that a government’s human rights
obligations be taken into account when assessing the scope of its obligations and potential liabilities to
foreign investors, tribunals have tended to dismiss such arguments rather summarily. This includes by not
engaging with the arguments at all, by determining that human rights were not in fact at risk, and/or by
concluding that the government’s obligations to protect and fulfill human rights did not excuse its
obligations to comply with investment treaty commitments. 
As the field of international investment law continues to evolve, however, future investor-state arbitration
decisions may give more weight to and become more thorough in their treatment of human rights
arguments. Some international arbitration tribunals have been somewhat more receptive to grappling with
human rights concerns or arguments in relation to investment disputes. The Urbaser v. Argentina award,
for example, marked the first time an investment tribunal has accepted jurisdiction over a state’s
counterclaim asserting breaches of international human rights law.42 In relation to a dispute regarding a
concession contract for water and sewage services, Argentina alleged that the investor’s failure to make the
agreed investments led to, amongst other things, violations of the human right to water,43 with implications
for the health and environment of the local community, along with implications on related rights such as
the right to adequate housing and living conditions. Although ultimately dismissing the claims on the merits,
a number of the tribunal’s determinations with respect to the counterclaim are noteworthy. For example,
the tribunal recognized a sufficient connection between the original claim and the counterclaim and
explicitly rejected the investor’s argument that human rights counterclaims and investment disputes are
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BOX 9: HOW INTERNATIONAL BODIES HAVE TREATED CONFLICTS BETWEEN INVESTOR
PROTECTION OBLIGATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS – CONTINUED
mutually exclusive.44 Moreover, the tribunal considered that the investor as a private party could bear
obligations under international law, including an obligation “not to engage in activity aimed at destroying”
certain rights.45 In Bear Creek v. Peru, mentioned above, a partial dissenting opinion also engaged with
human rights arguments advanced in an amicus curiae submission. In a departure from the majority’s
approach to the calculation of damages, the partial dissent asserted that the investor claimant’s failure to
obtain a social license to operate should result in a 50% reduction of the damages award. In general,
however, these examples represent the exception. To date, engagement by investment tribunals with human
rights-based argumentation advanced by host states and amici curiae remains rare (although tribunals
appear more open to considering human rights concerns advanced by investor claimants).46
CONCLUSION
Governments’ multiple legal obligations relevant to
investment—and the ways in which those obligations
interact—can complicate efforts to govern investment
appropriately and to ensure that rights-holders are not
harmed by investment projects. While the legal
frameworks discussed in this primer do not inherently
conflict, governments’ legal obligations can collide in
specific situations; when this happens, a government
may discover that its obligations under human rights law,
international investment law, domestic law, and/or a
contract are not easy to reconcile.
There are many reasons why governments might find
themselves in situations in which their various legal
obligations collide. To name a few: a change to a more
democratic or post-conflict regime, a lack of clarity at the
time an investment was approved of the human rights
impacts that would arise, or the evolution of relevant human
rights norms by which the government seeks to abide.
Regardless, the particulars of how a government found itself
in such a situation does not absolve the government of its
obligations to protect human rights. Nor does its track record
of compliance with human rights to date.
Understanding the ways in which various legal obligations
interact is important for governments seeking to address
the needs and concerns of their citizens in the context of
investment. Yet awareness of these legal frameworks is
not a reason to avoid good faith actions designed to
protect rights-holders or to address their concerns. When
governments take action in the public interest—for
example, to strengthen environmental and labor laws or
to regulate the use of property rights—those actions are
frequently challenged in domestic courts. The fact that a
challenge has been brought does not mean that the
government’s action was illegitimate, nor that the
government should not have taken that action. 
One distinction between domestic challenges and those
brought under investment treaties is that governments
can regulate the flow and implications of domestic
challenges through rules on who may sue, on what
grounds, and for what remedies, whereas governments
are less able to control the expansive way in which
tribunals have interpreted investment treaties to date. As
long as investment treaties exist in their present form, it
will be difficult if not impossible for governments to avoid
claims challenging even good faith actions taken to
address public interest issues.
Legal frameworks, and how they interact, are often
invisible in the day to day. Yet they are powerful forces
that influence government actions and that help to shape
who benefits and who loses from foreign investment.
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